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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
this door opens and the degree to which the new exceptions change
Maryland trial practice will depend entirely upon future decisions of
Maryland's appellate courts.
JEFFREY E. GREENE
C. General Evidentiary Objections Still Valid in Maryland
1. Introduction-The new Maryland Rules of Evidence offer
practitioners a convenient and streamlined set of rules that will bene-
fit trial practice in terms of both judicial economy and legal clarity.I
Although modeled in part on Federal Rule 103, Maryland Rule 5-103
retains several attributes of the former Maryland common-law and
court rules that governed objections to evidentiary rulings for preser-
vation on appeal.2 These disparities between new Maryland Rule 5-
103 and its well-established federal counterpart are significant and
may serve to undermine many of the advantages and opportunities
sought through the codification process.
In effect, Maryland Rule 5-103, which changes current Maryland
practice very little, contains three significant differences from Federal
Rule 103. First, the Federal Rule requires that an attorney state the
specific ground of objection 3 while the Maryland Rule only requires
that an attorney state a general objection.4 Second, in Maryland, er-
ror may only be predicated on a ruling by which a party is
"prejudiced,"5 while in federal court, error may be predicated on a
ruling in which "a substantial right of the party is affected."6 Finally,
the Federal Rule expressly allows the appellate court to take notice of
plain errors that affect substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the trial court,7 while the Maryland Rule
does not.
This Note will discuss the provisions of the new Maryland Rule
and contrast them with the provisions of Federal Rule 103. Through
this comparison, the likely effects of new Maryland Rule 5-103 on trial
and appellate practice will be examined. The Note will also briefly
address the matter of motions in limine which is treated tangentially by
the new rule.
1. See LYNN MCIAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 1.2 (1994).
2. See MCLAIN, supra note 1, §§ 2.103.2 to 2.103.3.
3. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).
4. MD. R. 5-103(a)(1).
5. MD. R. 5-103(a).
6. FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
7. See FED. R. EvrD. 103(d).
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2. Matyland Rule 5-103.-Maryland Rule 5-103 controls the pres-
ervation for appeal of objections to evidentiary errors at trial.8 The
Rule states that in order for an evidentiary ruling to be preserved as
error for appeal, the ruling must have been prejudicial.9 If the al-
leged error was in the admission of evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike must appear on the record, stating the specific
grounds of the objection if the specific grounds are requested by the
court or required by rule."° If, on the other hand, the alleged error
was one that excluded evidence, the substance of the evidence must
have been made known on the record if it was not apparent from the
context in which it was offered."
The Rule further states that the court may add to any ruling an
explanation of the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, and the objection made.12 Finally, the Rule makes clear that
proceedings on objections or offers of proof shall be conducted, to
the extent practicable, in order to avoid jury exposure to inadmissible
evidence. 3 These latter two aspects of the rule are identical to the
Federal Rule and have not given rise to controversy; they will not be
discussed further in this Note.
3. Federal Rule of Evidence 103. -The note appended to the new
Maryland Rule states that it is "derived in part from" Federal Rule of
8. Maryland Rule 5-103 states:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling.-Error may not be predicated upon a ruling that
admits or excludes evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling, and
(1) Ojection-In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objec-
tion or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objec-
tion, if the specific ground was requested by the court or required by rule; or
(2) Offer of Proof-In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the sub-
stance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer on the record or was
apparent from the context within which the evidence was offered. The court may
direct the making of an offer in question and answer form.
(b) Explanation of Ruling.-The court may add to the ruling any statement that
shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, and the
objection made.
(c) Hearing ofJury.-Proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable,
so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to a jury by any
means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions within
the hearing of the jury.
MD. R 5-103.
9. MD. R. 5-103(a).
10. MD. R. 5-103(a) (1); see infra note 31 and accompanying text for discussion of the
phrase "or required by rule."
11. MD. R. 5-103(a)(2).
12. MD. R. 5-103(b).
13. MD. R. 5-103(c).
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Evidence 103.14 The Federal Rule establishes the method by which
evidence is offered by one party and objected to by another. 5 The
Rule places the responsibility on counsel, rather than on the court, to
raise a timely objection to the admission of objectionable evidence.16
The failure to object in a timely fashion and to make a statement of
the specific grounds therefor, if the specific grounds are not apparent
from the context, amounts to a waiver of the objection on appeal.' 7
The only exception to this general approach is the plain error
doctrine. 18
The notion of plain error allows an appellate court to review
items which were not objected to at the trial if they are sufficiently
serious to merit such special treatment. 9 Consequently, Federal Rule
14. MD. R. 5-103, source note.
15. Federal Rule 103 states:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further state-
ment which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered,
the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer
in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing ofjury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the
jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking ques-
tions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors af-
fecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.
FED. R. ENID. 103.
16. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 52 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
17. Id.; see also United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936). The Supreme Court
noted:
The verdict of a jury will not ordinarily be set aside for error not brought to the
attention of the trial court. This practice is founded upon considerations of fair-
ness to the court and to the parties and of the public interest in bringing litiga-
tion to an end after fair opportunity has been afforded to present all issues of law
and fact.
Id. at 159.
18. FED. R. Evin. 103(d).
19. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 52, at 78; see also Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160 ("In excep-
tional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest,
may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors
are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation
ofjudicial proceedings.").
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of Evidence 103 places the responsibility on both the parties and the
trial court to preserve a sufficient record of what happened during
trial to enable an appellate court to determine whether reversible er-
ror occurred. If the court sustains an objection to a question posed to
a witness, the proponent of the question should make an offer of
proof to the judge as to what the witness would say if allowed to an-
swer and what the proponent hoped to prove.20 This offer of proof
allows a trial judge to reconsider the question of admissibility2' and
preserves information about the evidence that an appellate court
should consider in determining whether the trial judge's ruling was
correct.22 The offer of proof generally must be made out of the hear-
ing of the jury so as not to influence it with excluded evidence.23
4. Comparison of the New Rule with Prior Practice in Maryland and
with Federal Rule of Evidence 103.-Prior to the enactment of Title 5 of
the Maryland Rules, the law of evidence in Maryland had to be
gleaned from "a crazy quilt of common law, sewn over here and there
by newer patches of particular court rules and statutes. 124 The most
significant change that Title 5 represents for Maryland practice is that
Maryland's law of evidence is now codified into a unified and coher-
ent system.23 This should greatly improve the accessibility of the law
of evidence and the consistency with which the law is applied in Mary-
land courts.26
An area of controversy related to the passage of these new rules is
the extent to which they differ from the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Judge Chasanow of the Court of Appeals dissented in part from the
court's decision to adopt the new rules because he questioned the
need to incorporate most of the differences with the Federal Rules.2 7
Judge Chasanow argued that the Federal Rules are taught in law
20. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 51, at 73. But see United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406
(9th Cir. 1977) (holding that no offer of proof was necessary when trial court excluded
impeachment evidence because court was fully aware of substance of the excluded
evidence).
21. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 51, at 73. For example, a piece of evidence may be
admissible only for a limited purpose. FED. R. EVID. 105. If the offer of proof clarifies that
it is only being offered for that limited purpose, then the court may decide to overrule the
objection and instruct the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for
which it is admissible. See id.
22. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 51, at 73.
23. FED. R. EvID. 103(c).
24. McLAIN, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 21 Md. Reg. 1-3 (Jan. 7, 1994) (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
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schools and are familiar to, and have been praised by, practitioners.2 1
Thus, Judge Chasanow commented, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."2 9
The differences between Maryland Rule 5-103 and the Federal
Rule seem, moreover, to have been designed simply to avoid changing
Maryland practice in any significant way. Thus, prior Maryland case
law will still determine what is meant by many of the requirements of
Rule 5-103.so
a. Specific vs. General Objections.--One of the more surprising
aspects of Maryland Rule 5-103 is that it preserves a prior practice,
which required only general objections to evidence, unless specific
grounds are requested by the trial judge or required by rule.3 '
Once a general objection has been noted at trial, it can be the
basis for any possible error on appeal because specific grounds for an
objection are not required in Maryland. 2 In practice, the Maryland
Rule acts as an incentive not to state the grounds for an objection
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id. at 1.
30. For example, the Court of Appeals has long applied an objective standard for de-
ciding at what point the basis for an objection becomes apparent. Moxley v. State, 205 Md.
507, 515, 109 A.2d 370, 373 (1954); see also Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 543, 386 A.2d
336, 337 (1978) (stating that litigant must make objection known to court "at the earliest
practicable opportunity"). If it is reasonably clear that a question posed is objectionable,
opposing counsel must object at the time the question is asked, rather than waiting to hear
the answer. Klecka v. State, 149 Md. 128, 132, 131 A. 29, 30 (1925). But see Moxley, 205
Md. at 515, 109 A.2d at 373 ("[W]here the answer is not responsive to the question or, due
to the general nature of the question, the answer is disconnected and introduces matter
which could not be fairly anticipated, the trial court can strike it down on a timely
motion.").
Moreover, if objectionable matter is raised a second or subsequent time, a second or
subsequent objection must be made. See S & S Bldg. Corp. v. Fidelity Storage Corp., 270
Md. 184, 190, 310 A.2d 778, 782-83 (1973) (holding that earlier objection did not apply to
subsequent questioning where evidence to which objection was sustained was then elicited
later with no objection raised); cf. Beghtol v. Michael, 80 Md. App. 387, 392-93, 564 A.2d
82, 84 (1989) (finding that appellant waived objection by failing to object at several times
during the trial when opposing counsel asked objectionable questions), cert. denied, 318
Md. 514, 569 A.2d 643 (1990). The Beghtol court discussed the then-new concept of contin-
uing objections as allowed by MD. R. 2-517(b) although such an objection was not made by
the party claiming error in the case. Id at 393-94, 564 A.2d at 84-85.
31. See, e.g., Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 151 A.2d 737 (1959) (general objection ap-
propriate). The phrase "required by rule" in Maryland Rule 5-103 refers to Maryland Rules
2-520(e) and 4-325(e) which require that objections to jury instructions, in civil and crimi-
nal trials respectively, include a statement of the specific grounds for the objection. See
MD. R. 2-520(e) & 4-325(e).
32. See Robert, 220 Md. at 167-68, 151 A.2d at 741; see also Bates v. State, 32 Md. App.
108, 113, 359 A.2d 106, 110 (general objection to admissibility of confession may be re-
garded as encompassing both voluntariness of confession and taint derived from illegal
arrest), cert. denied, 278 Md. 715 (1976).
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because, if a specific objection is made, the appeal is limited to the
specific ground raised."3
The general objection rule may have made more sense when the
law of evidence in Maryland was not codified into a single set of rules
that could fit into a litigator's back pocket.' Tolerance for the gen-
eral objection may promote sloppy practice in the courtroom, because
lawyers can object any time they have a vague sense that something
said is harmful to their client.3 5 These lawyers hope that the trial
judge will share their general sense that something was objectionable
or, better, recognize a specific ground for objection, and sustain the
objection without asking for the specific grounds.36 By contrast, the
Federal Rule places the responsibility on the opponent of the prof-
fered evidence to make clear to the court why it is inadmissible.3 7
Rule 5-103's requirement of a timely objection to the admission
of evidence in order to preserve an error for appeal has long been
recognized in Maryland.3' This requirement arose out of considera-
tions ofjudicial economy and fairness to the opposing party because it
gives the court the opportunity to correct the error at the trial level
and, perhaps, obviate the need for an appeal.3 9 The argument for
requiring a timely objection applies with equal force to the require-
ment for counsel to state specific grounds. Clearly, this was the moti-
vation behind the specific objection requirement of Federal Rule
103.40
The use of the general objection was not anticipated in an earlier
published draft of the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Proposed Mary-
33. Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55, 395 A.2d 126, 137 (1978) (holding that because
appellant's objections were specifically stated as based on relevancy grounds, he was lim-
ited to that ground on appeal); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md. App. 706,
724, 369 A.2d 118, 128 (stating that appellants' objection to leading questions of expert on
direct was insufficient to preserve objection to relevance), cerm. denied, 280 Md. 730 (1977).
34. Interview with Professor Alan Hornstein, University of Maryland School of Law,
former Co-Special Reporter to the Maryland Rules Committee's Subcommittee on Evi-
dence, in Baltimore, Md. (Sept. 20, 1994).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See McCoRMiCK, supra note 16, § 52.
38. See, e.g., Moxley v. State, 205 Md. 507, 515, 109 A.2d 370, 373 (1954) ("The princi-
ple governing the time for objection, which has been stated and restated, is that the one
against whom evidence is offered must object as soon as the applicability of the evidence is
known or should reasonably have been known to him.").
39. See, e.g., Zellinger v. CRC Dev. Corp., 281 Md. 614, 380 A.2d 1064 (1977).
40. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 103 states, in perti-
nent part: "Rulings on evidence cannot be assigned as error unless ... the nature of the
error was called to the attention of the judge, so as to alert him [or her] to the proper
course of action and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures." FED. R.
EVID. 103 advisory committee's note.
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land Rule 5-103 stated that grounds for an objection to the admission
of evidence had to be stated specifically, unless the ground for objec-
tion was apparent from the context or the court excused the objecting
party from stating the grounds-essentially a reflection of federal
practice.4" The reporter's notes made clear that, at least initially, the
Court of Appeals' Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure considered the federal specific objection rule to be preferable
to the general objection rule.4" However, the Committee also recog-
nized that it takes time for a change in the rules to establish itself in
practice, especially when judges and attorneys are so used to the old
ways. The 1992 draft consequently offered an "escape hatch" for at-
torneys who were excused from stating specific grounds by judges who
were still in the mindset of the prior law.43 The Committee minutes
reveal that the Committee was closely divided on the initial decision to
change Maryland practice to more closely conform to federal
practice.44
Professor Lynn McLain, who served as Co-Special Reporter to the
Subcommittee on Evidence, explained to the Committee that, prior to
1957, the practice in Maryland was to give specific grounds for objec-
tions in order to provide the judge with an opportunity to correct the
error, if possible, and to preserve the specific error for appeal. 45 How-
ever, Committee members argued that requiring a statement of spe-
cific grounds would slow down the docket, particularly where the
grounds are often apparent 46 or where a requirement to state the
grounds might necessitate constant bench conferences.4 7 A subse-
41. COURT OF APPEALS STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
PROPOSED TITLE 5 OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 4 (1992) [hereinafter
PROPOSED TITLE 5].
42. Id. at 5. It should be mentioned that general objections are allowed in federal
courL However, if they are overruled, they may not serve to preserve error for appeal.
McComic, supra note 16, § 52, at 75.
43. PROPOSED TITLE 5, supra note 41, at 5. The language of this portion of Proposed
Maryland Rule 5-103 stated that "a timely objection or motion to strike [must appear on
the record] stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not appar-
ent from the context or the court excused the objecting party from stating the specific grounds." Id.
at 4 (emphasis added).
44. Adoption of the modified federal practice in the proposed Maryland Rules was
apparently agreed upon by a one-vote margin. Minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure [hereinafter Minutes], May 15, 1992, at 10.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 10 (statement of Mr. Finnerty). The Federal Rule, however, specifies that it is
not necessary to state the grounds for an objection if they are apparent from the context.
See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 247 n.5 (1st Cir. 1976) (explaining that
criminal defendant did not forfeit objection by failing to state grounds where they were
apparent from context and were understood by all parties).
47. Minutes, May 15, 1992, supra note 44, at 10 (statement of Mr. Lombardi).
1120 [VOL. 54:1032
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quent motion to change the rule in order to retain the prior Maryland
practice carried unanimously.
4
b. Harmful Error. -The difference in wording between what
constitutes harmful error in Maryland courts49 and in the federal
courts5° may not be as significant as it appears at first glance. Judge
Chasanow, however, saw this difference as an example of an "unneces-
sary, and perhaps confusing" change from the language of the
equivalent federal rule.51
The Committee note states that the difference in language be-
tween the federal and Maryland rules is not meant to "change the
existing standard for harmless error in a criminal case."5" The Court
of Appeals firmly established the criminal standard in Dorsey v. State,53
where it held that in an appeal from a criminal trial, a defendant does
not have to prove that an error is prejudicial.54 Rather, the burden is
on the appellate court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that an erro-
neous ruling was not harmful to the defendant's case before the court
may dismiss an appeal without ordering a new trial.55 By contrast, in
an appeal from a civil case, the burden is on the appellant to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the ruling affected the outcome
of the case adversely to his or her interests.56
By using the phrase "substantial rights affected," the Federal Rule
leaves room for a distinction between error which is prejudicial in a
48. Id. at 10-11.
49. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling... unless the party is prejudiced by
the ruling...." MD. R. 5-103(a).
50. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling... unless a substantial right of the
party is affected .... " FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
51. 21 Md. Reg. 2 (Jan. 7, 1994) (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
52. MD. R. 5-103 committee note. It is important to bear in mind that "committee
notes, source references, and annotations are not part of these rules." MD. R. 1-201 (e).
53. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
54. Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
55. Id. In Dorsey, the Court of Appeals adopted the test for constitutional error in crim-
inal trials enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
as the test for all errors in criminal trials in Maryland. Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at
678. The Dorsey court explained that when an appellate court, upon an independent re-
view of the record, finds that properly admitted evidence has weighed overwhelmingly
against the defendant and the prejudicial effect of any erroneously admitted evidence was
insignificant by comparison, or was cumulative, it may conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that admitting the improper evidence was harmless error. See id. at 649, 350 A.2d at
672. A verdict will not be overturned for harmless error because the accused has a right to
a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Id. at 647, 350 A.2d at 671.
56. See Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659 n.15, 350 A.2d at 678 n.15; see also Rippon v. Mercantile
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 213 Md. 215, 222, 131 A.2d 695, 698 (1957) (in a civil appeal,
burden is on appellant to show both prejudice and error).
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civil case and error which is merely harmful to a defendant in a crimi-
nal trial. But the Maryland Rule, by using the word "prejudiced," sug-
gests that error in criminal trials will now be reviewed on the basis of
the more difficult test used for error in civil trials; that is, the error will
be a basis for reversal only if the appellant can show prejudice.
Judge Chasanow pointed out the apparent change in Maryland
law created by this language: "The Committee's note regarding the
harmless error rule in criminal cases may clarify the rule .... but there
still may be an ambiguity because the 'prejudice' requirement in the
amended rule seems identical in civil and criminal cases."57 It may be
necessary for the Court of Appeals to explicate this rule in future case
law to make clear that the standard for harmful error in criminal ap-
peals has not changed as a result of the new Maryland Rule.
c. Plain Error.-Plain error is that error which is sufficiently
serious to be reviewed on appeal even though it was not properly ob-
jected to and preserved at trial.5" The Committee chose to delete the
paragraph of the Federal Rule concerning plain error because it ap-
peared "to be more a rule relating to appellate review than to evi-
dence."59 Also, Maryland, with one exception, does not use the "plain
error" terminology.' The exception is the use of a plain error analy-
sis for jury instructions in criminal cases, which an appellate court may
examine if the error was material to the rights of the defendant, de-
spite the defendant's failure to object at trial.61
In the Committee's view, the very limited reach of the plain error
doctrine in Maryland was already sufficiently expressed by Maryland
Rules 4-325(e) and 8-131 (a).612 Rule 8-131, which gives an appellate
court discretion to review errors not properly preserved for appeal "if
necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense
and delay of another appeal," 3 will continue to govern the review by
the appellate court of errors not objected to at trial.'
Judge Chasanow criticized the reasons given by the Committee
for not including the plain error provision of Federal Rule of Evi-
57. 21 Md. Reg. 2 (Jan. 7, 1994) (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
58. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 52, at 78.
59. See 125TH REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RuLEs 13 (1993).
60. Id.; see also PROPOSED TITLE 5, supra note 41, at 5 (explaining that Maryland does
not recognize "plain error doctrine with regard to nonconstitutional evidentiary issues").
61. "An appellate court, on its own initiative or on the suggestion of a party, may how-
ever take cognizance of any plain error in the [jury] instructions, material to the rights of
the [criminal] defendant, despite a failure to object." MD. R. 4-325(e).
62. See 125TH REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RuLEs 13.
63. See MD. IL 8-131(a).
64. See MD. R. 5-103 cross reference.
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dence 103.65 First, if the plain error doctrine is more a rule of appel-
late review than a rule of evidence, so is the section of the Rule
concerning what may be preserved for review.' Second, he disagreed
with the implication of the Committee note that the only time the
plain error terminology is used in Maryland is with regard to plain
error in jury instructions in criminal matters.6 7 He viewed it as "at
least conceivable" that the plain error doctrine would be applied in
other contexts.68
d. Motions in Limine.-The Committee was concerned that
Maryland Rule 5-103 would be perceived as changing the existing
practice in Maryland with regard to the use of motions in limine be-
cause of the requirement that offers of proof be made "on the rec-
ord."6 9 At issue is whether a motion in limine, typically made just
before trial begins, counts as being on the record of the trial.
The Committee note to Maryland Rule 5-103 explains that the
Rule does not preclude objections. or offers of proof through motions
in limine.7° If a motion in limine to exclude evidence is denied, the
general rule is that the moving party must renew the objection at trial,
when the evidence that was the subject of the motion is offered, in
order to preserve the objection for appeal.7" An offer of proof is not
required, however, after a pretrial ruling to exclude evidence when
the judge's pretrial ruling was clearly intended to be the last word on
the matter.72
The controlling precedent is Prout v. State,75 in which a criminal
defendant made a motion in limine to "advise the court" that he
planned to introduce evidence of the prior convictions of the state's
only witness in order to impeach her credibility.74 The trial court
65. 21 Md. Reg. 2 (Jan. 7, 1994) (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
66. Id. But Rule 5-103(a) addresses what counsel must do during trial in order to pre-
serve an error for appellate review, so it is properly a rule of trial practice. MD. R. 5-103 (a).
The plain error paragraph in the Federal Rule does not implicate any action that has to be
taken at the trial level. See FED. R. EVID. 103(d). Rather, it clarifies that the Rule does not
preclude the appellate court from consideration of plain errors which were not appropri-
ately objected to at trial.
67. 21 Md. Reg. 2 (Jan. 7, 1994) (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
68. Id. But see Nesbitt v. Bethesda Country Club, Inc., 20 Md. App. 226, 233, 314 A.2d
738, 742 (1974) (stating that discretion to review jury instructions not objected to at trial
does not exist in civil cases).
69. Minutes, May 15, 1992, supra note 44, at 11.
70. MD. R. 5-103 committee note.
71. MCCORMICK supra note 16, § 52, at 75.
72. MD. R. 5-103 committee note.
73. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988).
74. Id. at 351, 535 A.2d at 446.
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ruled that it would not allow into evidence the witness's prior convic-
tions for prostitution and solicitation, which the court did not view as
bearing on her credibility.7" Defense counsel took exception to the
court's ruling.76 The defendant was later found guilty.77
On appeal, the State argued that the defendant had not pre-
served the court's exclusion of the impeachment evidence.78 The
Court of Appeals held that when the trial judge resolves the motion in
limine by excluding evidence, the proponent of the evidence is left
with no choice but to follow the trial court's instructions not to prof-
fer the evidence at trial.7 9 Under these circumstances, the trial court's
ruling on the motion in limine is preserved for review without further
action on the part of counsel.8 °
The Committee considered adding language to Rule 5-103 to ad-
dress the Prout situation;8" however, it decided that Prout was an unu-
sual enough circumstance that it did not need to be codified, but
could simply be addressed by a Committee note.82
5. Conclusion. -Maryland Rule 5-103 deviates from the compara-
ble Federal Rule through the continuation of Maryland's general ob-
jection practice. This deviation is unfortunate because it does not
contribute to the goal ofjudicial economy by establishing a solid basis
to correct error at the trial level. The deviation is unnecessary be-
cause, under a unified code of evidence, there is no reason why Mary-
land lawyers cannot state the grounds for their objections with
specificity. Other difficulties lurk: The language of Maryland Rule 5-
103 suggests that there is no longer a distinction between what com-
prises harmful error in criminal and civil trials. The Committee's in-
tent, nevertheless, was not to do away with the distinction between
these standards. Also, the absence of a provision on plain error re-
flects the more limited use of that doctrine in Maryland in contrast to
federal law. Finally, practice in Maryland with regard to motions in
limine will not change as a result of the enactment of Maryland Rule 5-
103.
75. Id. at 352-53, 535 A.2d at 447.
76. Id. at 353, 535 A.2d at 447.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 353-54, 535 A.2d at 447.
79. Id. at 356, 535 A.2d at 449.
80. Id.
81. See Minutes, May 15, 1992, supra note 44, at 13. "Mr. Titus moved to draft language
to be put in subsection (a) (2) [of Rule 5-103] codifying the case law on motions in limine,"
and his motion carried unanimously. Id.
82. Minutes, June 19, 1992, supra note 44, at 50-51.
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To the extent that future practice under the new rules will lead to
change in the rules, any movement toward greater consistency be-
tween language and application of the state and federal rules can only
strengthen them. In particular, the general objection requirement
should be changed to place Maryland practice squarely in conform-
ance with federal practice.
DINAH S. LEVENTHAL
D. What Is a "Crime Relevant to Credibility"?
Evidence of a person's character' is generally not admissible in
court,' however, there are many exceptions to this general rule.3 One
of these exceptions, evidence of a prior conviction used to impeach
credibility, has long been recognized in one form or another.4 This
exception was codified most recently in Maryland Rule 5-609.' Rule 5-
609 does not change existing Maryland law significantly, yet its silence
on exactly which crimes are relevant to credibility will continue to pro-
mote substantial litigation on the matter.
1. "Character... means the aggregate of a person's traits, including those relating to
care and skill and their opposites." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 304 (1942).
2. See MD. R. 5-404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character ... is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... .").
3. See, e.g., MD. R. 5-404(a) (1) (A) ("Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of an
accused offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same" is admissible).
4. See discussion infra Part 1.
5. Rule 5-609 provides:
Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime:
(a) Generally.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness, but
only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the wit-
ness's credibility and (2) the court determines that the probative value of admit-
ting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the
objecting party.
(b) Time Limit.-Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this Rule if a
period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction.
(c) Other Limitatioms.-Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible under sec-
tion (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if:
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated;
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from thejudgment of convic-
tion is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or filing an application for leave
to appeal has not expired.
(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere.-For purposes of this Rule, "conviction" in-
cludes a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence, whether or not the
sentence is suspended.
MD. R. 5-609.
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